Français [Français]

[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [Previous Menu]

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

1992 Public Report

Table of Contents


Foreword

[Table of Contents]


The Government of Canada in On Course, its response to the five- year statutory review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, has recognized the necessity for continuing to provide information about CSIS and the security intelligence environment within which it works in Canada. As part of the evolutionary process of informing the public about its role as a protector of Canadian national security, CSIS has produced this second Public Report.

The 1991 CSIS Public Report provided an overview of the Service's operating environment and an explanation of how intelligence is provided for government decision-makers. Building upon this base, this report describes the changing security intelligence environment and CSIS' ability to respond flexibly to the changes.

CSIS must understand the nature of the global security environment in order to identify implications for Canada and to respond in ways that are consistent with the Service's legislated mandate. This report outlines CSIS' perception of the security intelligence environment as it is now and will be for the foreseeable future.

As is evident in this report, this is not the first time CSIS has had to adapt to change. Throughout its nine-year existence, the Service has adjusted to the changing world around it. CSIS has maintained the ability to respond in a manner which is both operationally and administratively flexible to the extensive changes to the threat environment and the government's subsequent direction. This has proven to be no less the case with the most recent shifts in the security intelligence environment.

Part I: The Global Security Environment

Table of Contents

A forecast of global security describes a changing environment where the international terrorist threat remains undiminished, where traditional intelligence concerns have declined, but in which new priorities are emerging. Diversity, volatility and complexity characterize this environment. Unpredictability has replaced the former stability of bipolar confrontation managed by two superpowers. In this uncertain environment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's unique mandate and set of skills to investigate, analyze and forewarn continue to be integral to the maintenance of national security and public safety.

General trends in international terrorism in coming years are likely to include the following:







Since 1989, the world has undergone unprecedented upheavals. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the overthrow of authoritarian régimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Gulf War and the political changes in the Middle East have created a new geopolitical environment. The demise of the Soviet Union, and more recently the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created power vacuums and realignments of countries. This has provided strategic openings for some states and exposed the weaknesses of others. The direct result has been an explosion of pent-up ethnic nationalism that has yet to play out its course. Thus far, it has created:





Thus, not everything about the new world order is new or orderly. Other examples abound:







Increasingly, migrants from countries with little or no democratic tradition will tend to be seen by their homeland régimes as potential sources of opposition or assets to be exploited. Such immigrant communities may well become targets for penetration, manipulation and coercion by foreign intelligence services, thus threatening to limit expression of their new-found rights.

Part II: Security Intelligence Implications For Canada

Table of Contents

The global security environment summarized above has direct consequences for Canada. Central to the Service's role in being able to adjust to this new environment and to provide the government with forewarnings of threats is its ability to assess the implications for Canadian security.

Information in support of this role is collected largely by CSIS' Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence Branches. In addition, the Security Screening Branch provides an effective program, important not only to maintaining Canadian security, but also the confidence of allies and economic partners with whom we share vital, restricted information.

Counter-Terrorism

An effective Counter-Terrorism program aimed at public safety will remain the Service's first priority. The significant difference between international and domestic terrorism is that the former lies beyond the control of Canadians to remedy. Most terrorist threats originate from volatile situations abroad, including those involving Sikh and Tamil terrorism, the Middle East, Armenia and Northern Ireland. Canada is currently used for fund-raising, procurement of weapons, planning and as a safe-haven by several extremist groups. There is no expectation that international terrorist activity will diminish. So long as international turmoil and conflict persists, Canada will continue to be vulnerable.

Counter-Intelligence

Diversity and complexity characterize current and emerging Counter-Intelligence concerns. While not as hostile as they once were, Russia's and the People's Republic of China's intelligence services nevertheless remain active against Western interests. Currently, the Service has identified several countries with known or suspected, undeclared intelligence officers operating in Canada. They conduct activities ranging from monitoring their own citizens to penetrating and coercing Canadian ethnic communities and/or collecting military, economic and technical intelligence.

In contrast, the Service is in varying stages of developing relations with a number of former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Foreign Influenced Activity

Canada is a preferred destination for immigrants and those seeking asylum from the troubled spots in the world. Some of these new arrivals are from countries with few democratic traditions. Certain of these foreign governments target expatriate communities in Canada to ensure they do not become the focus of dissent or opposition.

Given Canada's multicultural population, CSIS cannot ignore any of the growing number of homeland conflicts around the world. The Service must be able, therefore, to collect and analyze information and to identify emerging issues and advise government before they become a threat to public safety or national security.

Economic Security

The threat to Canada's economic security is likely to escalate in importance as economic matters rise to the top of national agendas. Economic espionage may be defined as the illegal or clandestine acquisition of critical Canadian economic information and technology by foreign governments or their surrogates. Economic security, accordingly, requires the prevention of such activities in the interests of protecting Canada's economic welfare and ability to sustain an internationally competitive position.

More than two dozen countries use their intelligence services world-wide for economic espionage. In the past decade several of these countries are known to have conducted economic espionage against Canadian interests.

Technology Transfer and Proliferation

CSIS' Technology Transfer Unit analyzes proliferation and technology transfer issues, and has established an active liaison program in the private sector. Discussions, primarily with private high-technology and industrial interests in Canada, have attempted to foster and heighten awareness of the vulnerability of information to clandestine acquisition.

CSIS assessments of technology transfer between 1980 and 1990 concluded that:





Canada's competitive economic status is unlikely to be directly threatened by the theft of economic secrets by developing countries lacking the infrastructure and know-how to exploit this intelligence. However, covert economic espionage by these countries remains a concern because of the possibility of the information being bartered or sold to other countries or multinational corporations able to use the information or technology to Canada's disadvantage.

Automated information systems and communications networks are particularly relevant to ensuring Canada's economic security. Computer data banks will continue to be an attractive target. Computer systems will be accessed illegally, to Canada's economic disadvantage. Tracing economic security threats back to a specific country may, moreover, become increasingly difficult.

There is increasing evidence that some foreign governments are sending their students and scientists to Canada to procure expertise and technology related to the developments of weapons of mass destruction. The protection of such technology is vital to Canada's interests and alliances and to ensuring world peace and stability.

Domestic Issues

As in any democracy, Canada's social, political and economic agendas include a wide range of interests and points of view. At least some of these may prove attractive to extremist elements within the country, who would seek their own solutions via means totally unacceptable to the vast majority of Canadians. The rise of right-wing extremism in parts of Europe, for example, and evidence of similar pernicious activity in Canada, remains a source of continued concern. It is CSIS' responsibility to identify and to advise the government of the emergence or activity of such extremists groups that pose a threat to Canada's security.

Overall, the global security environment reflects a marked drop in superpower tensions and a reduction in traditional espionage activities which characterized the cold war era. Conversely, a rise in the number of conflicts involving nationalist, ethnic, religious and economic forces continues to pose a range of threats to Canadian security. The Service has reacted quickly to operational implications of these major shifts in global security.

Part III: Resource Implications

Table of Contents

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984 as a civilian agency to alert the Government about threats to the national security. CSIS' primary legislated mandate is to collect and analyze information and report its findings to the Government of Canada. Another aspect of the Service's work involves security screening. An effective screening program is vital not only to protect Canadian security, but also to maintain the confidence of allies and economic partners by ensuring their secrets are safe here as well. Equally important, immigrant screening will remain a means of barring entry to terrorists and others who present security concerns.

Under the authority of the CSIS Act, information can be gathered on people engaged in one of the following four types of activity: foreign-influenced activities, politically-motivated violence (terrorism), espionage and subversion.

Upon transition in 1984, CSIS had 1,968 positions. CSIS staff occupied eight separate buildings throughout Ottawa as they established distinct operational units for counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism, counter-subversion and security screening during the early months of the new organization's existence. The distribution of resources for counter-intelligence was four times greater than for counter-terrorism in those early days.

The number of terrorist incidents accelerated dramatically in the eighties. Worldwide patterns and the scope of terrorist incidents became more and more apparent. One of the consequences was that terrorism became increasingly defined as an intelligence problem as well as a police matter. In Canada, counter-terrorist activity increased following the 1982 assassination of a Turkish military attaché en route to work in Ottawa, and the 1985 takeover of the Turkish Embassy, in which a security guard was killed. Air India Flight 182 was downed off the coast of Ireland in 1985, resulting in the deaths of all 329 people on board, most of whom were Canadians.

Partly as a direct response to these developments, counter-terrorism resources, including personnel, were enhanced during 1986 and 1987. Since that time, there has been a continuing adjustment of operational resources to match the changes in the security environment. Consequently, 56 per cent of counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism resources are now allocated to counter-terrorism.

The role of the Service came under special scrutiny in 1987 when Gordon Osbaldeston, former Clerk of the Privy Council, was asked to present a plan of action to the Solicitor General. The plan called for an examination of operational policies in support of counter-subversion activities, as well as for a review of the organization's personnel policy framework. Looking back on implementation of the Government's decision to establish CSIS, the Osbaldeston Report noted the Security Intelligence Review Committee's concern that the counter-subversion program "... casts its net too widely". Osbaldeston recommended that the counter-subversion branch be eliminated, and that its duties and functions be reassigned. The Service responded by eliminating the counter-subversion program.

Regarding the adequacy of CSIS resources, the Osbaldeston Report concluded that, with the proclamation of the CSIS Act: " ... a number of new requirements were also created, many of which had to be provided from scratch. Among them were a complete management structure, an administrative system to provide the support previously drawn from the RCMP, accommodation separate from the RCMP, new communications and computer systems and a methodology for dealing with a complicated system of external review. All of this was to be provided, as a former member of CSIS management put it, 'on a shoestring'. The turmoil generated in simply getting CSIS established is a factor often overlooked by the critics," the Report said.

Among many other things, the Report recommended a complete review of all CSIS capital and operating resource requirements to determine a basis " ... from which to set reasonable and adequate resource levels for the Service." The government responded by providing additional funding over four years for personnel and operating requirements. The report also called for an "immediate" solution to the problem created by having a staff that was by 1987 at a level of 2,153 positions operating out of eight separate buildings in Ottawa. The government responded with a commitment to construct a new headquarters building at a total cost of $151 million. The new building will bring all CSIS headquarters personnel under one roof. Construction of the facility has begun with completion expected in 1995 within the approved budget.

As a consequence of the dramatic changes to the security environment in the late 1980's and early 1990's and as a consequence of the Service's participation in the government's restraint program, a further adjustment to Service resources was made in 1992. CSIS reduced its human resource requirements from their post-Osbaldeston high of 2,760 positions by 11 per cent. This has been accomplished while maintaining the Service's first priority and essential capacity to deal with threats to public safety through the counter-terrorism program.

CSIS Human Resources

(Establishment)

1984/85: 1,968

1985/86: 1,964

1986/87: 2,153

1987/88: 2,319

1988/89: 2,318

1989/90: 2,526

1990/91: 2,683

1991/92: 2,729

1992/93: 2,760

1993/94: 2,465

1994/95: 2,366

1995/96: 2,244

1996/97: 2,077

1997/98: 2,021

By 1992/93 and 1993/94, the budget had grown to $217 million and then $229 million respectively. The major contributing factor to these budgetary increases is the disbursements associated with the construction of the new CSIS headquarters building. The construction costs will peak in the 1993/94 and the 1994/95 fiscal years. A substantial drop in the CSIS budget will then occur when construction is completed.

The international security environment has gone from being hostile but relatively predictable to one marked by diversity, complexity and volatility. In these circumstances, adjustments have been made to ensure that the security intelligence mandate is met with a priority on public safety and at an acceptable level of risk.

[Table of Contents]



[Welcome Page] [Main Menu][Previous Menu]

Disclaimer: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service assumes no responsibility for the use of the information at this World Wide Web (WWW) site.

© CSIS/SCRS 1996

Canada wordmark